We investigate how the dynamic e¤ects of oil supply shocks on the US economy have changed over time. We …rst document a remarkable structural change in the oil market itself, i.e. a considerably steeper, hence, less elastic oil demand curve since the mid-eighties. Accordingly, a typical oil supply shock is currently characterized by a much smaller impact on world oil production and a greater e¤ect on the real price of crude oil, but has a similar impact on US output and in ‡ation as in the 1970s. Second, we …nd a smaller role for oil supply shocks in accounting for real oil price variability over time, implying that current oil price ‡uctuations are more demand driven. Finally, while unfavorable oil supply disturbances explain little of the "Great In ‡ation", they seem to have contributed to the 1974/75, early 1980s and 1990s recessions but also dampened the economic boom at the end of the millennium.
Introduction
The belief that physical disruptions in the supply of crude oil in the world oil market are at the origin of stag ‡ationary episodes has gained ground in the wake of the two big oil shocks of the 1970s. 1 Since that time oil price increases are associated in many people's minds with severe macroeconomic consequences in terms of higher in ‡ation and lower economic growth. A remarkable feature of the recent, prolonged surge in oil prices however, is the relatively mild impact this seems to exert on real economic activity and the price level. This observation casts doubt on the relevance of oil shocks for the macroeconomic performance of the US economy in more recent times. In other words, the way the economy experiences oil shocks appears to have changed fundamentally. This conjecture has recently been con…rmed in the empirical literature by Edelstein and Kilian (2007a) , Herrera and Pesavento (2007) and Blanchard and Galí (henceforth, BG 2007 ). In particular, these studies …nd a reduced impact of oil price shocks on US macroeconomic aggregates over time. The objective of this paper is to further investigate how the dynamic e¤ects of oil supply disturbances have changed and whether global oil supply shocks can be considered as an important source of economic ‡uctuations. We evaluate the importance of physical production shortfalls in explaining ‡uctuations in the real price of oil as well as their contribution to the observed movements in US real GDP growth and consumer price in ‡ation when time variation is accounted for.
The main results that emerge from our analysis are the following. We foremost document a remarkable structural change in the global oil market. Speci…cally, a "typical" oil supply shock is characterized by a much smaller impact on world oil production and a greater e¤ect on the real price of crude oil since the second half of the 1980s. Only a steeper, hence, less elastic oil demand curve can explain this stylized fact. This …nd-ing has important consequences when the macroeconomic e¤ects of oil supply shocks are compared over time. If a comparison is based on a similar change of crude oil prices (e.g. a 10 percent rise), we currently …nd a more muted impact on the US economy which is consistent with the existing evidence for oil price shocks. This comparison, however, cannot really be made because a di¤erent underlying oil supply shock is considered. In particular, a constant slope of the oil demand curve is implicitly assumed which is at odds with our evidence. On the other hand, if an exogenous oil supply shock is measured as a similar shift in world oil production (e.g. a production shortfall of 1 percent), such a disturbance has a much greater impact on oil prices now, resulting also in stronger e¤ects on real GDP and consumer prices compared to the 1970s and early 1980s. However, also this comparison is biased since an average oil supply shock is characterized by a disturbance in oil production of more than 2 percent in the 1970s and hardly 0.5 percent since the 1990s. When we consider a typical one standard deviation oil supply shock instead, we …nd a rather similar impact on US macroeconomic aggregates over time. In addition, oil supply disturbances consistently account for 15 to 20 percent of output and in ‡ation variability.
If the e¤ects of average oil supply shocks have not dramatically changed since the 1970s, it is surprising that we are currently not confronted with similar macroeconomic conditions. To explain this, we demonstrate that oil supply shocks explain little of the Great In ‡ation, which is consistent with the propositions of Kilian (henceforth, BK 2002, 2004 ). In addition, oil supply disturbances seem to have played a signi…cant but certainly non-exclusive role in the 1974/75, early 1980s and 1990s recessions; by the same token, unfavorable oil supply shocks in 1999 made a signi…cant negative contribution to the ongoing boom at the end of the millennium. Moreover, we show that the contribution of oil supply shocks to ‡uctuations in the real price of oil has decreased over time which means that current oil price movements are more demand driven. Despite a relatively constant share of oil supply shocks in explaining the variance of oil production growth (being constantly around 30 percent) and the aforementioned higher leverage e¤ect on oil prices, the latter …nding implies that also the oil supply curve is currently more inelastic. A steepening of both the oil demand and oil supply curves can be considered as a source of increased oil price volatility in more recent times.
The analysis in this paper departs from the existing literature along two dimensions. First, the paper makes use of recent methodological contributions in explicitly modeling time variation. Instabilities over time in the crude oil market and the oil-macro relationship have been widely documented in the literature. 2 On the one hand, the oil market itself has undergone substantial changes. Global capacity utilization rates in crude oil production have not been constant over time, with production levels being above sustainable capacity since the late 1980s, as well as in 1973/74 and 1979/80 (Kilian 2008c ). In addition, the transition from a regime of administered oil prices to a market-based system of direct trading in the spot market and the collapse of the OPEC cartel in late 1985 were accompanied by a dramatic rise in oil price volatility (e.g. Hubbard 1986 ). Furthermore, the relative importance of the driving forces behind oil price movements has changed (e.g. BK 2002 BK , 2004 Hamilton 2003 Hamilton , 2008a Rotemberg 2007 ). 3 On the other hand, also the macroeconomic structure has changed over time which can bring about time-varying e¤ects of oil shocks. 4 Prominent explanations for di¤erent macroeconomic consequences of oil shocks over time discussed in the literature are improved monetary policy (e.g. Bernanke et al. 1997 ; BG 2007), 5 more ‡exible labor markets (BG 2007) , changes in the composition of automobile production and the overall importance of the US automobile sector (Edelstein and Kilian 2007b) , and variations in the role and share of oil in the economy over time (e.g. Bernanke 2006; BG 2007) . Other arguments for changing macroeconomic e¤ects of oil shocks that have been put forward are time-varying mark-ups of …rms (Rotemberg and Woodford 1996) and changes in …rms'capacity utilization (Finn 2000) .
All these changes suggest that a linear, constant-coe¢ cient speci…cation may not accurately capture the e¤ects of oil supply shocks on the US economy. Consequently, time variation has to be allowed for in order to adequately model the interaction between oil shocks and aggregate economic activity and to explore how this relationship has evolved over time. Several studies, using a vector autoregression approach (e.g. Edelstein and Kilian 2007a; Herrera and Pesavento 2007), take time variation into account by splitting the sample into two subperiods assuming a structural break sometime in the 1980s. 6 Alternatively, BG (2007) allow for a more gradual variation over time by estimating bivariate vector autoregressions over rolling time windows. 7 To model time variation, we estimate a multivariate time-varying parameters Bayesian vector autoregression (TVP-BVAR) with stochastic volatility for the period 1970Q1-2006Q2 in the spirit of Sargent (2002, 2005) , Canova and Gambetti (2004) and Benati and Mumtaz (2007) . The varying coe¢ cients are meant to capture smooth transitions in the propagation mechanism of oil shocks without imposing a speci…c breakpoint, while the stochastic volatility component models changes in the magnitude of structural shocks and their immediate impact. The latter feature is particularly important in the present setting given the documented increased volatility in the oil market and the reduced macroeconomic volatility. By using a multivariate approach, it is also possible to learn more about potential sources of time variation.
Second, we propose a new identi…cation strategy to isolate the unanticipated movements in the price of crude oil due to exogenous supply shocks. Most studies, including BG (2007), rely on a recursive identi…cation scheme where all variations in oil prices are assumed to be oil supply shocks. This view, however, has been challenged in the recent literature. BK (2002), for instance, argue that the oil price rises of the seventies might be the result of expansionary monetary policy and Kilian (2008c) shows that only a small fraction of observed oil price ‡uctuations can be attributed to exogenous oil production disruptions. Therefore Kilian (2008a) , based on the assumption of a vertical short-run supply curve, identi…es oil supply shocks as the only source of innovations in global oil production, whereas shocks to the demand for crude oil have an immediate e¤ect only on oil prices in a monthly VAR. His identifying assumptions are, however, less appropriate for estimations with quarterly data such as real GDP. For that reason he uses a singleequation approach to estimate, in a second step, the impact of quarterly shocks on US real GDP and CPI in ‡ation by averaging the monthly structural innovations over each quarter. 8 To allow for an immediate e¤ect of both oil supply and oil demand shocks on oil production and the real price of crude oil, we propose to use sign restrictions instead, to identify oil supply shocks in a quarterly VAR. 9 Speci…cally, the sign restrictions are derived from a simple supply and demand model of the world oil market. Using both world oil production and oil price data, oil supply shocks are identi…ed as the only disturbances that displace the oil supply curve in this market. As a consequence, our method recognizes the fact that contemporaneous movements in oil prices and oil production could also be driven by disturbances relating to the demand for crude oil. Moreover, given our time-varying framework, the magnitude of the contemporaneous impact of structural shocks on oil production and prices can vary over time and hence, changes in the relative importance of oil supply and demand shocks and the slope of both curves are captured. We also show that our conclusions do not depend on the selected methodology and underlying assumptions. In particular, robust results are found for alternative speci…cations, the modeling of time variation and the identi…cation strategy. 8 In this way, Kilian (2008a) 
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology and describes the identi…cation strategy in more detail. Section 3 discusses the main empirical results and evaluates the robustness of our …ndings. In section 4, we discuss some potential explanations for a less elastic oil demand curve in more recent periods, and section 5 o¤ers some concluding remarks.
Methodology

A VAR with time-varying parameters and stochastic volatility
We model the joint behavior of global oil production, the real re…ner acquisition cost of imported crude oil, 10 US real GDP and US CPI as a VAR with time-varying parameters: 11 y t = c t + B 1;t y t 1 + :::
The frequency of our data is quarterly and the overall sample covers the period 1947Q1-2006Q2. The …rst twenty years of data are, however, used as a training sample to generate the priors for the actual sample period. 12 The lag length is set to p = 4 to allow for suf…cient dynamics in the system. 13 The time-varying intercepts and lagged coe¢ cients are stacked in t to obtain the state-space representation of the model. The u t of the observation equation are heteroskedastic disturbance terms with zero mean and a time-varying covariance matrix t which can be decomposed in the following way:
A t is a lower triangular matrix that models the contemporaneous interactions among the 1 0 This oil price variable measures most accurately the marginal cost of crude oil to US re…ners. It is therefore the best proxy for the free market global price of imported crude oil. For di¤erent concepts of world oil prices, see Mabro (2005) . We have checked the sensitivity of our results to alternative oil price measures such as the WTI spot oil price and the composite re…ner acquisition cost; our conclusions are not altered by the choice of this variable. Results are available upon request. 1 1 All variables are transformed to non-annualised quarter-on-quarter rates of growth by taking the …rst di¤erence of the natural logarithm. The nominal re…ner acquisition cost has been de ‡ated using the US CPI. A detailed description of all the data used in this paper can be found in Appendix A. 1 2 We have also experimented with shorter sample periods to calibrate our priors. Given su¢ ciently di¤use priors, our results were not altered by the choice of the training sample. 1 3 An appropriate lag structure is necessary to adequately capture the dynamics contained in the data.
Since most studies in this literature opt for a lag order of four quarters, we also choose this for reasons of comparability. Moreover, Hamilton and Herrera (2004) also argue that too short a lag length might omit the primary e¤ects of oil shocks. However, our …ndings are qualitatively similar when less lags are included.
6 endogenous variables and H t is a diagonal matrix which contains the stochastic volatilities: 
The drifting coe¢ cients are meant to capture possible nonlinearities or time variation in the lag structure of the model. The multivariate time-varying variance covariance matrix allows for heteroskedasticity of the shocks and time variation in the simultaneous relationships between the variables in the system. Allowing for time variation in both the coe¢ cients and the variance covariance matrix, leaves it up to the data to determine whether the time variation of the linear structure comes from changes in the size of the shock and its contemporaneous impact (impulse) or from changes in the propagation mechanism (response). Given the observed instabilities in the oil-macro relationship, this approach is particularly expedient. Let t be the vector of non-zero and non-one elements of the matrix A t (stacked by rows) and h t be the vector containing the diagonal elements of H t . Following Primiceri (2005) , the three driving processes of the system are postulated to evolve as follows:
ln h i;t = ln h i;t 1 + i i;t i;t
The time-varying parameters t and t are modeled as driftless random walks. 14 In line with Primiceri (2005) we do not impose a stability constraint on the evolution of the time-varying parameters to enforce stationarity of the VAR system. 15 The elements of the vector of volatilities h t = [h 1;t ; h 2;t ; h 3;t ; h 4;t ] 0 are assumed to evolve as geometric random walks independent of each other. 16 The error terms of the three transition equations are 1 4 Canova and Gambetti (2004) have also experimented with more general autoregressive processes for the law of motion of the coe¢ cients but report that the random walk speci…cation was always preferred. Moreover, as has been pointed out by Primiceri (2005) , the random walk assumption has the desirable property of focusing on permanent parameter shifts and reducing the number of parameters to be estimated. 1 5 Initially, we have included an indicator function which selected only stable draws i.e. the indicator function I ( t) = 0 if the roots of the associated VAR polynomial are inside the unit circle as e.g. in Cogley and Sargent (2005) . However, our acceptance ratio was so high as to make this constraint obsolete. 1 6 Stochastic volatility models are typically used to infer values for unobservable conditional volatilities.
The main advantage of modelling the heteroskedastic structure of the innovation variances by a stochastic volatility model as opposed to the more common GARCH speci…cation lies in its parsimony and the independent of each other and of the innovations of the observation equation. In addition, we impose a block-diagonal structure for S of the following form: 17 We estimate the above model using Bayesian methods. An overview of the prior speci…cations and the estimation strategy (Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm) is provided in Appendix B.
Identi…cation of oil supply shocks
Separating the endogenous and exogenous sources of movements in the price of crude oil has proven to be a di¢ cult task. In most VAR-based studies (e.g. Burbidge 18 Treating the unpredictable variations in the price of oil as exogenous with respect to the developments in the US economy (and more generally, global macroeconomic forces) …nds its origin in the belief that at least the major oil price shocks were due to production shortfalls caused by political events in the Middle East. Implicit in this view is the assumption that oil price changes derive exclusively from the supply side of the oil market. However, it is now commonly accepted that oil prices, especially in more recent decades, are also driven by demand conditions (see BK 2002 BK , 2004 Hamilton 2003 Hamilton , 2008a Kilian 2008a; Rotemberg 2007) . Consequently, innovations in the oil price equation of a VAR are not necessarily an adequate measure of exogenous variations in oil supply since they may also capture shifts in the demand for crude oil. In that sense, the resulting estimates only represent the economic e¤ects of an average oil price shock determined by a combination of supply as well as demand factors which independence of conditional variance and conditional mean. Put di¤erently, changes in the dependent variable are driven by two di¤erent random variables since the conditional mean and the conditional variance evolve separately. Implicit in the random walk assumption is the view that the volatilities evolve smoothly. 1 7 As has been shown by Primiceri (2005, Appendix D) , this assumption can be easily relaxed. 1 8 A lot of studies employ nonlinear transformations of the oil price, such as the net oil price index (Hamilton 1996 (Hamilton , 2003 , as a measure of exogenous supply shocks which already takes asymmetries into account. However, it is even less clear how to interpret a (negative) innovation to such a …ltered variable.
can bias the estimates. 19 This concern is even more relevant in a time-varying context, in particular when the relative importance of oil supply versus oil demand shocks has changed over time. Others (e.g. BG 2007) have made the case that this distinction does not matter since an oil price shock triggered by increased demand for oil in one country can still be experienced as a supply shock by the remaining countries. This presumption is, however, very stringent in the light of the results of Kilian (2008a) and Peersman and Van Robays (2008) who show that there exist important di¤erences in the responses of macroeconomic aggregates depending on the underlying source of the oil shock. Intuitively it is clear that an increase in the price of oil induced by favorable global economic conditions exerts a di¤erent in ‡uence on the macroeconomic performance than one due to oil supply interruptions resulting from a war (see Rotemberg 2007) . 20 Moreover, considering only oil prices also implicitly assumes that the slope of the oil demand curve remains constant over time. However, if the elasticity of the demand curve is not invariant over the sample period, a similar physical disruption in the supply of crude oil due to e.g. a military con ‡ict, will have a very di¤erent impact on the oil price itself which complicates intertemporal comparisons. In section 3, we will show that the slope of the demand curve has indeed changed over time.
A di¤erent strand of the literature has developed measures based on physical oil supply disruptions associated with major political crises in oil-producing countries in order to extract the magnitude of exogenous oil supply shocks. Hamilton (2003) uses a quantitative version of the dummy-variable approach (Dotsey and Reid 1992) to isolate the exogenous component of oil price movements by measuring the oil supply curtailed by exogenous events which are largely political in origin. 21 He compares the observed production level before a military con ‡ict started with the largest drop of oil supply in the a¤ected countries in subsequent periods. The magnitude of the production shortfall is then de…ned as the exogenous oil supply shock expressed as a percentage of world oil production. Kilian (2008c) constructs an alternative measure of exogenous oil supply shocks by comparing the actual production shortfalls in the wake of a political crisis to an explicit counterfactual path of how production would have evolved in the absence of the crisis. The counterfactual production level is derived from countries which are subject to the same economic incentives but not involved in the con ‡ict. While these methods avoid potential problems 1 9 Despite its innovative oil futures-based identi…cation approach, the study by Anzuini et al. (2007) is also prone to fall prey to this criticism because they also mix supply and precautionary demand shocks. regarding the endogeneity of the oil price series, a shortcoming is that they are closely tied to a selection of relevant historical episodes and no generic supply shocks are identi…ed. 22 Kilian (2008a) allows shocks to the demand for crude oil to have a contemporaneous impact on oil prices in a monthly vector autoregression. To identify an oil supply shock, he assumes that the latter is the only disturbance which has an immediate in ‡uence on the level of oil production. Accordingly, shifts in the demand for oil only have a delayed e¤ect on crude oil production, i.e. a vertical short-run supply curve is assumed. This assumption is, however, less appropriate when quarterly data are used like in our study. In addition, oil production could already react to expected shifts in economic activity which are not fully captured in such a setting.
Elaborating on work by Faust (1998) (2007), we propose to use sign restrictions on the estimated time-varying impulse responses to identify structural oil supply shocks. More speci…cally, the restrictions are derived from a simple textbook supply and demand model for the global oil market. In the spirit of Kilian (2008a), we present the global oil market by world oil production and the world crude oil price. An oil supply shock is identi…ed as any shift in the oil supply curve and hence, results in an opposite movement of oil production and the real price of crude oil. 23 In particular, the identifying assumptions are that after an unfavorable oil supply shock world oil production does not increase and the real price of crude oil does not decrease. 24 These restrictions are su¢ cient to uniquely identify global oil supply disturbances without having to impose zero restrictions on oil prices or production to distinguish them from other shocks. Furthermore, no condition at all constrains the responses of real output and consumer price in ‡ation. The reactions of these variables will eventually be determined by the data. Since our focus is on the time-varying e¤ects of oil supply shocks, we only partially identify the model. All other shocks, i.e. shocks with an impact on oil prices and production of the same sign, are considered as oil demand shocks. These could be oil-speci…c demand shocks or shifts in the oil demand curve resulting from changes in economic activity. 25 We impose the sign conditions to be binding for four quarters following the shock. Consequently, our restrictions accommodate a potential sluggishness 2 2 Also Anzuini et al. (2007) heavily rely upon the use of previously selected exogenous events. 2 3 For illustrative purposes of our identi…cation assumptions, we refer the reader to Figure 3 , panel A. 2 4 These restrictions are imposed as weak inequality constraints and , thus including also the possibility of no change, i.e. a zero response. As a consequence of these inequality contraints, our identi…cation scheme does not deliver exact identi…cation. See Fry and Pagan (2007) for a discussion of this type of restrictions and potential problems. 2 5 In Baumeister and Peersman (2008), we also estimate the impact of di¤erent oil demand shocks, in particular oil-market speci…c demand shocks and global shocks in economic activity.
in the adjustment of the oil market. Some robustness checks with regard to alternative restrictions and the horizon over which the sign constraints are imposed are conducted in section 3.3. The details for the computation of the time-varying impulse responses and the implementation of the sign restrictions are described in Appendix C. Figure 1 displays the median impulse responses of world oil production, the real price of oil, US real GDP and US CPI to a one standard deviation oil supply shock for horizons up to 20 quarters at each point in time spanning the period 1970Q1 to 2006Q2. 26 The estimated responses have been accumulated and are shown in levels. In general, an unfavorable oil supply shock results in a permanent fall of oil production and a permanent rise of the real re…ner acquisition cost of imported crude oil. Consistent with expectations, the shock is followed by a signi…cant slowdown in real economic activity and increases in consumer prices, variables which were not constrained. This evidence emerges even more clearly in Figure 2 , panel A, where the time-varying median responses of the four variables are plotted four quarters after the shock, 27 together with the 16 th and 84 th percentiles of the posterior distribution. Speci…cally, after a representative oil supply shock, we observe a relatively similar impact on output over time, which is statistically more signi…cant in the second half of the sample, as well as slightly stronger in ‡ationary e¤ects. 28 We also performed some bilateral tests for time variation to measure the statistical signi…cance of di¤erences over time. For this purpose, we sample 10,000 impulse responses from the posterior distribution of each quarter and calculate the di¤erence with draws from the posterior of some benchmark periods. 29 For several benchmark quarters, we …nd a 2 6 The 3D-graphs of the time-varying impulse responses are to be read in the following way: along the x-axis the starting quarters are aligned from 1970Q1 to 2006Q2, on the y-axis the quarters after the shock are displayed, and on the z-axis the value of the response is shown in percent. All responses have been normalized in such a way that the structural innovations raise the price of oil. 2 7 This choice can be rationalized by the fact that the greatest e¤ect on real GDP is expected to occur with a delay of 3 to 4 quarters after the shock (Hamilton 2008a ). However, given the persistency of the responses, the message is not altered if di¤erent horizons are selected. 2 8 For real GDP, we also …nd somewhat stronger e¤ects over time for longer horizons after the shock, as can be seen in Figure 1 . 2 9 See also Gambetti (2006) for similar tests. Since this exercise generates a separate distribution for each horizon of each quarter in the sample for all benchmark periods, we do not show the results, but they are available upon request.
Results
Impulse responses
statistically signi…cant, stronger e¤ect of a one standard deviation oil supply shock on consumer prices in more recent periods and for some quarters even a larger long-run impact on output. This evidence is striking, given the results presented in Edelstein and Kilian (2007a), Herrera and Pesavento (2007) and BG (2007), who …nd a reduced impact on real output and consumer prices over time.
We do …nd, however, considerable time variation in the dynamics of the oil market itself which is symptomatic of the fact that the global oil market has undergone fundamental structural changes. By all appearances the interaction between oil production and oil prices varies remarkably across time periods with an obvious declining trend in the response of oil quantity and a stronger impact on the oil price level since the mid-eighties. Also for the episodes 1973/74 and 1979/80, we observe an increased reaction of crude oil prices. Not surprisingly, a statistically signi…cant, smaller impact on oil production and greater e¤ect on real oil prices over time is strongly con…rmed by the bilateral tests.
A natural question which emerges is why we …nd such a change in the oil market over time. We observe that the responses in the oil market set in immediately. Since the magnitude of the shocks are inextricably intertwined with the contemporaneous response of the variable in question, this feature makes it di¢ cult to distinguish between dynamics and volatility. 30 However, a change in the underlying oil supply volatility alone cannot explain this stylized fact because the impact on oil prices and production does not change in the same direction over time (as illustrated in panel A of Figure 3 ). The only possible explanation for observing a smaller reaction of oil production in combination with a greater reaction of oil prices is a steepening of the oil demand curve, i.e. oil demand became less elastic over time (as shown in panel B). 31 Speci…cally, in order to push up oil prices, a huge reduction in world oil production was necessary before the mid-eighties because oil prices were much less sensitive to changes in oil supply then as they appear to be nowadays, with the exception of two episodes, namely 1973/74 and 1979/80.
The fact that the impact of a typical oil supply shock on oil quantity and prices changes dramatically every period complicates, however, the analysis of the time-varying dynamic e¤ects of an exogenous event in the oil market on the macroeconomy. The way the normalization is done for the experiment becomes very important. Since the focus of previous research has centred on an unanticipated increase in the price of oil, consider for instance, 3 0 This is a standard problem when VAR results are compared across di¤erent samples or estimated with time-varying parameters. Only the contemporaneous impact of a shock on a number of variables can be measured. Consequently, it is not possible to know exactly whether the shock itself (volatility) has changed or the immediate reaction (economic structure) to this shock. 3 1 This observation does not exclude the possibility that the variability of oil supply shocks has also changed over time, but this alone could never explain our …ndings.
the e¤ect of an oil supply shock which raises the real price of oil by 10 percent on impact. ). This experiment, however, implicitly assumes a constant slope of the oil demand curve over time which is clearly not the case. As a consequence, the results of such a normalization cannot be compared because a di¤erent underlying supply shock is considered. Speci…cally, a 10 percent rise in oil prices is currently generated by an oil production shortfall of 1 to 2 percent. To elicit the same oil price move in the 1970s, a decline in the physical supply of crude oil of up to 15 percent is required, which actually never happened within the sample period. Despite the assertion by BG (2007) that "what matters [...] to any given country is not the level of global oil production, but the price at which …rms and households can purchase oil" (p.17), it appears that the volume of oil can be considered as an important input factor in the production process. 32 Alternatively, an oil supply shock can also be normalized on the quantity variable rather than on the price variable. Oil supply shocks have frequently been viewed as physical interruptions in the production of crude oil due to deliberate decisions by OPEC aimed at achieving a certain price level or destruction of oil facilities in the wake of war activities. 33 The dynamic macroeconomic e¤ects of exogenous oil supply shocks measured as a 1 percent decrease in global oil production on impact are shown in panel C of Figure 2 . The implied elasticity of the real price of crude oil with respect to a 1 percent shortfall in world oil production increases substantially over time, from an average value of 5 percent in the 1970s and 1980s to 10 percent in the 1990s up to 15 percent in the 2000s. These dramatic oil price increases triggered by a similar reduction in oil production in the second part of the sample are in turn more disruptive to the economy and emphasize the importance of the proper de…nition of the oil shock concept. The accumulated loss in real GDP growth is about twice as big in the 1990s and almost three times as big in the 2000s as in the 1970s. The response of consumer prices gets more pronounced from the 1990s onwards and continues to increase considerably in the 2000s. 34 However, also this intertemporal 3 2 Considering only the oil price might be realistic for a small country but is more problematic for the United States. 3 3 Since OPEC only controls the quantity supplied, the world oil price is only indirectly in ‡uenced. Even if at times OPEC announced a price target or e¤ectively "set" the reference price, it still had to regulate its production volume in order to obtain and maintain a certain price level. 3 4 This should not be too surprising since oil prices are part of the consumer price index and hence, larger 13 comparison cannot really be made since a typical (one standard deviation) shift of the crude oil supply curve is characterized by a change in world oil production of around 2 percent in the seventies, whereas this change amounts to only 0.5 percent from the midnineties onwards. Given the indistinguishability of volatility and immediate impact, our analysis cannot determine whether these smaller average changes in oil production are the result of a steeper oil demand curve or also the consequence of smaller shifts in the underlying oil supply curve over time. 35;36 
Relevance of oil supply shocks
It is still a widely held belief that the oil price hikes of the 1970s and early 1980s were the underlying source of macroeconomic stag ‡ation during that period (e.g. Hamilton 1983 ). Since the average e¤ects of oil supply shocks on US output and in ‡ation have not dramatically changed compared to the 1970s, it is surprising that the current macroeconomic conditions are so di¤erent. To shed some light on this issue, we now have a closer look at the variance and historical decompositions. Figure 4 displays the median timevarying contribution of oil supply shocks to the forecast error variance after 20 quarters of respectively world oil production growth, changes in the real price of crude oil, US real GDP growth and CPI in ‡ation together with the 16 th and 84 th percentiles of the posterior distribution. The contribution of oil supply shocks to the variance of CPI in ‡ation and real GDP growth in the US consistently ranges between 15 and 20 percent. The share of output volatility attributable to oil supply shocks oscillates moderately over time, whereas the fraction of movements in consumer price in ‡ation induced by unexpected oil supply disturbances exhibits a slight increase in more recent periods. The latter is not surprising given that the general volatility of CPI in ‡ation decreased over time, while the impact of oil supply shocks on in ‡ation did not decline. We can thus conclude that exogenous oil supply shocks are economically still relevant.
The decomposition also indicates that oil supply shocks account for approximately 30 percent of the forecast error variance in world oil production which only experiences moderate variations over time. However, the …gure reveals that the contribution of oil oil price increases automatically lead to a higher CPI even if second-round e¤ects are absent. However, this is probably not the main reason for our …ndings since, when we employ the implicit GDP de ‡ator as the measure of in ‡ation, we still …nd a substantial increase in the response of the price level over time. This result is also reported in section 3.3. 3 5 In subsequent work (Baumeister and Peersman 2008), we show that the underlying shifts of the oil supply curve have indeed declined over time. 3 6 Note that, in case of a vertical oil supply curve, the observed decrease in oil production changes would be fully driven by decreased oil supply volatility.
supply shocks to the variability in the real price of crude oil declines over time from around 30 percent in the …rst part of the sample to around 20 percent in later periods suggesting that they are currently a less important source of oil price movements. This evidence is consistent with Kilian (2008a,c) and the widely held belief that "demand increases rather than supply reductions have been the primary factor driving oil prices over the last several years" (Hamilton 2008a , p.175). Moreover, given the almost constant proportion of nonsupply shocks in world oil production and the increased contribution of these shocks to oil price variability, our results indicate that also the oil supply curve must have become more inelastic over time. A steeper oil supply curve is thus also a source of increased oil price volatility.
To evaluate whether exogenous shifts of the oil supply curve are responsible for speci…c episodes, the historical contribution of oil supply disturbances to the four endogenous variables are presented in Figure 5 . Speci…cally, these …gures show the baseline forecast of the variables augmented by the cumulative contribution of oil supply shocks (red line) as well as the actual time series in growth rates (blue line). The di¤erence between both is driven by other shocks. For real GDP growth, grey bars are added to indicate periods of recessions as dated by the NBER. With regard to in ‡ation, the graphs reveal that unfavorable oil supply shocks explain little of the Great In ‡ation. Despite the fact that there is a positive contribution, the bulk of excessive in ‡ation in the 1970s is explained by other shocks. While this insight is apparently in contrast with popular perception, it can still be reconciled with several recent …ndings in the literature. The supply-shock driven contribution to the historical evolution of the real price of crude oil itself and economic activity changes from episode to episode. During the 1973/74 oil embargo a major part of the oil price increase is attributable to oil supply shocks but they cannot account completely for the price spike. The contribution of oil supply shocks to the development of the price of oil during the events of 1978-80 is more limited and clearly indicates that this was more a demand-driven price shock mainly determined by rising oil demand at a time of low spare capacity. 37 The latter …nding con…rms BK (2002) and Kilian (2008a) who argue that pure oil supply shocks were never the sole driving force behind observed ‡uctuations in the real price of crude oil. On the other hand, a substantial share of the oil price hike after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 can be ascribed to unfavorable oil supply shocks. As a consequence, interruptions in the supply of crude oil did play a signi…cant role in the 1974/75, early 1980s and 1990s recessions. However, the contribution of oil supply disturbances to the poor macroeconomic performance was certainly not exclusive since a major part of the slowdowns is still explained by other shocks.
But also in more recent times unfavorable oil supply shocks had signi…cant e¤ects on real economic activity. Consider the 1999 oil supply disturbance, engineered by the joint decision of OPEC and non-OPEC countries to cut oil production, which made an important contribution to the oil price rise. This unfavorable shock had a negative impact on real GDP growth and made the ongoing strong economic boom before the millennium turnover more subdued whereas its role in the economic downturn of 2001 was negligible. In addition, most oil price surges since 2002 were driven by shocks a¤ecting the demand side of the oil market. The latter …nding is consistent with Kilian (2008a) and helps explain why these shocks were not accompanied by a major recession in the US. These evolutions could eventually have contributed to the belief that the way the economy experiences oil shocks has fundamentally changed over time.
Robustness analysis
Model properties and identi…cation. Since our speci…cation departs from standard models along two dimensions, namely identifying oil supply shocks by means of sign restrictions and explicitly modeling time variation, it is not entirely clear whether one of these two factors accounts for our results. We therefore check the robustness of our conclusions by looking at each aspect separately. First, we consider the changing e¤ects of oil supply shocks identi…ed with sign restrictions in a constant-coe¢ cient VAR by splitting the sample into two subperiods. Given our …ndings with time-varying parameters, the preferred date for the sample split is 1986 even though we still observe time variation within these two subsamples, e.g. the 1973/74 and 1979/80 episodes. 38 Second, following Kilian (2008a), we identify oil supply shocks using zero short-run restrictions but implemented in our time-varying framework. 16 one standard deviation oil supply shock is indeed more muted in the second subsample while the reaction of real oil prices is more pronounced, which con…rms our …nding of a less elastic oil demand curve over time. Also in line with our previous …ndings, there is hardly any time variation in the responses of real GDP and consumer prices across subsamples. As a consequence, our results are robust with respect to the speci…c modeling of time variation. Figure 6 , panel B, presents the time-varying median responses of the two oil market variables and macroeconomic aggregates to an oil supply shock identi…ed by a recursive ordering of the variables four quarters after the shock together with 16 th and 84 th percentiles. More speci…cally, in this setting only oil supply shocks have a contemporaneous impact on all four endogenous variables while shocks in oil demand do not have an immediate e¤ect on oil production. This identi…cation strategy is consistent with Kilian (2008a) . Note, however, that these restrictions are more plausible in a monthly VAR and less appropriate for our quarterly speci…cation. We nevertheless conduct the analysis as a robustness check but the results should be interpreted with more than the usual degree of caution. Also this alternative identi…cation strategy demonstrates clearly time variation in the oil market. In particular, the impact of an oil supply shock on global oil production becomes much smaller over time and the response of oil prices stronger, implying again a steepening of the demand curve for crude oil. As before, we do not observe a reduced reaction of macroeconomic variables over time. Surprisingly, the responses of the real price of crude oil after an unfavorable oil supply shock are slightly negative in the …rst half of our sample, which also explains the somewhat perverse e¤ects on real GDP and consumer prices during this period. This might be explained by the fact that an oil supply shock identi…ed in this way is contaminated by demand factors when using quarterly data, which could underestimate the true oil demand elasticity. This observation also conforms to our concerns about applying this identi…cation strategy in a quarterly framework in which the assumption of a short-run vertical supply curve appears to be problematic. The substantial rise in the oil price responsiveness to a typical supply shock since 1986 and the gradual reduction of its impact on oil production over time can, however, not be ignored and turns out to be a stylized fact. In sum, we can conclude that our results are also not in ‡uenced by our identi…cation strategy.
Alternative speci…cations. The robustness of our …ndings has also been analyzed by altering several features of the benchmark model. As already mentioned, the results do not depend on the number of lags included in the TVP-BVAR. 39 Also when assessing the sensitivity of our results with regard to the choice of the priors 40 and the number of periods for which the sign restrictions are imposed, the message this paper conveys is not modi…ed. Equally, using di¤erent oil price measures such as the WTI spot oil price and the real re…ner acquisition cost of composite crude oil does not change any of our conclusions described in the paper. Figure 7, panel A (left) , shows the time-varying impulse response functions of US unemployment when this variable is included as an alternative indicator of economic activity. The responses are comparable to those of real GDP in that we …nd a signi…cant rise following an unfavorable oil supply shock. Panel A (right) presents the outcome when the implicit GDP de ‡ator is used instead of CPI in ‡ation. 41 Although the responses are somewhat more subdued, the main message of the results are again not altered.
A hypothesis frequently put forward in the literature on the Great Moderation to account for the greater resilience of the economy in the face of adverse shocks is improved monetary policy (e.g. Clarida et al. 2000) . Including the federal funds rate in our model to take account of the endogenous response of monetary policy to oil shocks (Bernanke et al. 1997 ; Hamilton and Herrera 2004; Herrera and Pesavento 2007) does also not change our …ndings about the dynamic response of the US economy to oil supply shocks and the structural changes in the oil market as is evident from Figure 7 , panel B. 42 Implementation of restrictions. Since at the beginning of our sample the rise in nominal oil prices was constrained by institutional features of the oil market, 43 in particular long-term price agreements which were subject to revision only periodically, an obvious concern arises with regard to the timing of the restrictions imposed in the baseline case (t = 0 to t = 4) to identify oil supply shocks. When nominal prices in oil contracts are fully …xed, a positive aggregate demand shock in the real economy that raises world oil production and the general consumer price level, could then lead to a fall in the real price of crude oil unless nominal contracts are renegotiated timely to re ‡ect the new macroeconomic conditions. The resulting opposite movement in world oil production and real oil prices would then imply that this shock is erroneously identi…ed as an oil supply 4 0 We have experimented with di¤erent prior speci…cations which are commonly used in the TVP-BVAR literature. We report on them in more detail in Appendix B. 4 1 In this case the nominal price of crude oil is de ‡ated using the GDP de ‡ator. 4 2 Adding an additional variable comes at the cost of having to cut down on the number of lags included in the VAR (here p = 2); but as mentioned earlier, a shorter lag length does also not a¤ect the main results in our baseline speci…cation. 4 3 Hamilton (1983, p.232) notes that "oil prices have obviously been determined under a radically di¤erent institutional regime since 1973 than before". To a lesser extent, this could also be the case for the pre-1986 period.
shock. We address this potential problem in two ways to assess the sensitivity of our results to the identi…cation restrictions. First, we re-estimate the model with the nominal re…ner acquisition cost of imported crude oil. The sign restrictions to identify an oil supply shock are the same as in our baseline identi…cation scheme. Speci…cally, global oil production does not rise and the nominal oil price does not fall after an upward shift of the oil supply curve during the …rst four quarters after the shock. Note that the restrictions are imposed as > or 6, so that a zero reaction of the nominal oil price is still possible and the real oil price could even temporarily fall. 44 Given that the bulk of real oil price movements is driven by changes in the nominal oil price rather than general in ‡ation, it is not surprising that the results are not a¤ected, not even at the beginning of the sample. 45 Second, we also re-estimate the model with the real oil price, but now the sign restrictions are only binding from the fourth quarter after the shock onwards. Accordingly, the immediate reaction of oil production and the real price of crude oil are not required to conform to the expected sign. As emerges from Figure 7 , panel C, where the time-varying median impulse responses of the variables representing the global oil market and the US macroeconomy are displayed, our results are again robust with respect to the time period of the sign restrictions.
In general, our results are very robust: there are no discernible di¤erences in the evolutionary pattern of the structural features of the global oil market and the macroeconomic consequences over time compared to our benchmark model when alternative speci…cations are estimated.
Why steepening of the oil demand curve?
In this section, we consider three important developments in the oil market which could be relevant for the substantial reduction of crude oil demand elasticity; namely, the increased ‡exibility of the crude oil market, a changing role of oil in the economy and oil production capacity utilization. This list is by no means exhaustive and hence, does not exclude the contribution of other factors to the steepening of the oil demand curve which could be explored in future research. 4 4 It seems reasonable to assume that nominal oil contracts are revised the latest one year after the shock, especially since OPEC producers became more and more reluctant to increase oil production at arti…cially low prices during the early 1970s (BK 2002). 4 5 These results are not presented, but available upon request.
Increased ‡exibility of the world oil market. Since we observe an increased responsiveness of oil prices to a change in oil production since the mid-eighties, a natural candidate for the break is the transition from a regime of administered prices to a marketbased system of direct trading in the spot market around the same time, which implied a shift of price determination away from OPEC to the …nancial markets exposing oil prices to greater ‡uctuations (Hubbard 1986; Mabro 2005 ). 46 This development had two consequences. First, oil price volatility increased considerably. Second, the increased volatility attracted speculators and fostered the development of oil futures markets which have deepened considerably since the 1990s.
This increased ‡exibility of crude oil prices can, however, not explain our …ndings. More ‡exibility and increased relevance of the spot market could only a¤ect the speed of adjustment to an oil supply shock because, in the long run, also long-term contracts should re ‡ect the "correct" fundamental price. Figure 2 shows the impact after one year and Figure 1 presents the e¤ect for even longer horizons. All evidence points towards a considerably stronger long-run impact on crude oil prices in the second half of the sample period. Moreover, Figure 1 indicates that not even the speed of adjustment has changed a lot over time. For the whole sample, the e¤ect on oil prices is almost complete after 1 quarter. 47 In addition, increased volatility of the shocks as a result of more ‡exible markets should also be re ‡ected in a stronger impact on world oil production, which is hard to reconcile with our results. Consequently, more ‡exibility of the crude oil market cannot explain the steepening of the oil demand curve. On the contrary, a less elastic demand curve automatically leads to greater price ‡uctuations after a supply shock, which could thus be a source of increased volatility. The latter could actually have fostered the development of the spot market and the abolishment of administered prices.
Role and share of oil in the economy. It is conceivable that there have been structural transformations in industrialized as well as developing economies which might explain why oil demand is more inelastic since the mid-eighties.
First, in response to the oil price hikes of the 1970s, the role and share of oil in the US and other industrialized economies have changed substantially. In fact, industries switched away from oil to alternative sources of energy, developed more energy-e¢ cient technologies and improved energy conservation. These e¤orts have been supported by the governments who reacted to the oil crises by enacting codes to reduce oil usage and increase energy awareness. The resulting gradual substitution process as well as servicebiased growth (smaller share of industrial production in value added) led to a steadily falling oil intensity of economic activity, i.e. reduction in the use of oil input per unit of output as illustrated in Figure 8 , panel A. E¢ ciency gains in the usage of oil in the production process have often been put forward as one possible explanation for the milder e¤ects of oil shocks on the economy (e.g. BG 2007; De Gregorio et al. 2007) but also have important implications for the demand behavior and hence, the elasticity of oil demand since they induced fundamental changes in oil consumption patterns. 48 As a result of these developments, nowadays there are not much possibilities left for increasing energy e¢ ciency further because most possible technical upgrades and replacements of oil-dependent capital by capital that uses alternative sources of energy 49 are already in place so that there is only a reduced scope for additional substitution away from oil (Dargay and Gately 1994; Ryan and Plourde 2002). More importantly, the composition of total oil demand has altered with oil consumption now being concentrated in sectors (for instance transportation) where the lack of substitutes for petroleum at all times implied a low own-price elasticity of demand. The increasing share of these sectors in total oil demand might thus have contributed to a steepening of the oil demand curve.
Second, while increased e¢ ciency in oil use plays an important role for the declining importance of oil in industrialized economies, it is but one component of a broader concept which also takes the evolution of the real price of oil into account, namely the cost share of crude oil in US total expenditures. Following Hamilton (2008b), we calculate the value share of crude oil as the ratio of the dollar value of oil expenses to nominal GDP. 50 Figure  8 , panel B, displays the evolution of the share of oil purchases in total, economy-wide expenditures in the US economy over time. As is evident from the graph, the share of total production costs spent on oil has decreased considerably over time. One of Marshall's four rules of derived demand for factor inputs claims that there exists a direct link between the cost share of input factors in total production costs and the price elasticity of the derived demand for this factor (Marshall 1920 ). More speci…cally, the rule suggests that a smaller share of factor costs leads to a less elastic demand for that production factor if the demand elasticity for the …nal product is greater than the substitution elasticity between input factors (Peirson 1988 ). 51 Hence, the declining share of oil costs in total expenses over time could provide an additional clue for the decrease in oil demand elasticity. It also appears intuitively clear that a smaller share of oil in total production costs makes …rms less reactive to price ‡uctuations, especially in an environment of increased oil price volatility where cost increases are likely to be reversed quickly. However, it is rather unlikely that the cost share remains low in light of the recent oil price developments (Hamilton 2008b ), i.e. oil expenditures might as well regain importance in …rms'budgets which could again increase the demand elasticity.
Third, developing economies that are in the process of industrialization currently have a much higher share in global oil demand. These countries typically rely heavily on oil as an input factor and are therefore considered as being less reactive to changes in global oil prices. Speci…cally, as the governments of these nations are interested in fostering rapid economic growth, state-controlled oil product prices and fuel subsidies which shield consumers from the impact of rising global oil prices are prevalent features of these economies (Hang and Tu 2007). 52 In other words, oil demand in many developing countries is not a¤ected by oil price hikes because price ceilings are imposed on petroleum products that keep prices signi…cantly below market prices and hence, make consumer demand unresponsive to international price signals. This distortive pricing system could thus have important repercussions on oil demand in global markets. Given that the share of crude oil demand from the developing world is on the rise, it is possible that the responsiveness of demand will decrease further. On the other hand, the subsidies can not last forever and in some places a process of gradual dismantling of price caps has already been initiated.
Capacity constraints in crude oil production. The above explanations could well describe the developments since the mid-1980s but we also observe a signi…cant fall in the elasticity of oil demand for the 1973/74 and 1979/80 episodes. To account for this observation a di¤erent reasoning is required which allows conditions on the supply side of the oil market to in ‡uence demand behavior. At times of low spare capacity in world oil production, it is possible that small supply disruptions can lead to large price increases because market participants anticipate that a loss in oil output, resulting from war activities 5 1 For a dissenting view, see Pemberton (1989) . 5 2 "Both wholesale and retail prices of oil products in the domestic market are lower than they are in the global market" as exempli…ed for China by Hang and Tu (2007, p.2978) . In fact, an estimate by Morgan Stanley shows that almost a quarter of the world's petrol is sold at less than the market price (The Economist, 2008).
or other production shortfalls, cannot be replaced by other oil producers due to their operating already close to sustainable capacity. Although capacity constraints are normally a phenomenon related to the supply side, increasing capacity utilization rates also signal some tightness in the market which a¤ects the demand behavior of consumers by raising concerns about the security of future oil supplies that motivate precautionary buying in a tightening market. 53 Thus, this heightened uncertainty increases the willingness of agents to pay a higher price for a barrel of oil at the margin that provides insurance against potential scarcity, i.e. they pay a risk premium. 54 As a result, this less-elastic precautionary fraction of total oil demand could become larger, especially if no substitutes are available in the short run. 55 Put di¤erently, a certain amount of spare capacity provides a cushion which assures the market that exogenous shortfalls in production, caused intentionally or accidentally, can be compensated for; but when capacity utilization is already high before an exogenous event, this guarantee vanishes and induces market participants to alter their expectations (in anticipation of potential production disruptions) resulting in a more rigid oil demand curve. If oil supply is then indeed curtailed in such an environment, even small shocks in terms of losses in world oil supply can lead to considerable price increases because of a steeper demand curve. 56 Figure 9 shows global capacity utilization rates in crude oil production by year derived from IMF estimates of spare oil production capacity. A rate near 90 percent is commonly treated as an important threshold in view of the sustainability of future oil production at such high levels (Kilian 2008c ). Remarkably, we …nd world oil production to be very close to full capacity since the second half of the eighties. On the other hand, we also note two spikes in capacity utilization rates around the time of the two oil crises of the 1970s which could provide an explanation for the esti- 5 3 As has been noted by Gately (1984 Gately ( , p.1103 , "aggravating the market tightness was an extended period of aggressive stockbuilding by the importing countries for much of 1979 and 1980. Such a stockbuilding "scramble" during a disruption was certainly perverse. It undoubtedly drove price higher than it would have gone otherwise." This aggressive hoarding behavior could hint at the increased importance of less elastic precautionary demand in total oil demand in a tightening market. In fact, Adelman (2002, p.179) states that "when buyers fear damage from sudden dearth, there is also a precautionary motive; which may be joined to a speculative motive, to pro…t by buying sooner." 5 4 See Alquist and Kilian (2008) for a similar argument in relation to oil futures spreads. 5 5 Note that this is not an exogenous shift of the (precautionary) oil demand curve due to e.g. the possibility of a war, but an endogenous increase of (more inelastic) precautionary oil demand after an oil supply shock when operating close to full capacity. The former results in a shift of the oil demand curve, while the latter implies a steepening of the demand curve at higher utilization rates. mated increased price responsiveness to oil production shortfalls around the same time. 57 Consequently, oil production levels which are close to full capacity might be a reason for a steeper oil demand curve during the past two decades. This evolution was further facilitated by the increased ‡exibility of the oil market. In such a scenario, variations in oil supply quickly translate into price changes, especially in the face of shrinking global spare capacity which leads to a process of bidding up the prices because buyers compete at the margin for limited volumes of crude oil available on the spot market.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed the time-varying e¤ects of oil supply shocks on the US economy and the oil market from 1970 onwards. On the one hand, there are a priori many reasons to believe that the global oil market dynamics have changed over time. Consider, for instance, the transition from a regime of administered oil prices to a market-based system accompanied by a dramatic rise in oil price volatility, changing capacity utilization rates in crude oil production and altering driving forces of oil prices. On the other hand, the economic structure has also changed considerably. For instance, the relative importance of oil in the production process has diminished over time, labor markets have become more ‡exible and monetary policy more credible.
From a methodological point of view, we depart from the existing empirical oil literature along two dimensions. To account for gradual changes over time, we have estimated multivariate structural vector autoregressions with time-varying parameters and stochastic volatility in the spirit of Cogley and Sargent (2005) . Until now, time variation was analyzed via simple sample splits or the estimation of bivariate VARs with a moving window sample period. In addition, we propose a new strategy to identify oil supply shocks in a structural VAR using sign restrictions. Speci…cally, we identify an oil supply shock as a disturbance in the global oil market which shifts oil production and real crude oil prices in opposite directions. In contrast, all shocks that generate a positive co-movement between both variables are considered as oil demand shocks. Accordingly, we allow oil supply and demand disturbances to have an immediate impact on both oil prices and oil production. In the existing literature, oil supply shocks have been identi…ed by imposing a zero contemporaneous impact of shifts in oil demand on either crude oil prices, oil production or both.
Surprisingly, we …nd that the impact of a typical one standard deviation oil supply shock on the US macroeconomy has been relatively constant over time. This …nding stands in contrast to popular perception and a number of existing studies. However, this controversy can largely be explained by a remarkable structural change in the oil market itself. In particular, the oil demand curve is currently much steeper or less elastic relative to the 1970s and early 1980s which complicates comparisons over time. When the comparison is based on a standardized shift of oil prices (e.g. 10 percent rise), the impact on real GDP and in ‡ation becomes smaller over time which is consistent with the existing evidence. This comparison, however, does not take into account that the same change in oil prices is currently characterized by a much smaller movement in oil production which can be considered as a di¤erent oil supply shock. Conversely, when an exogenous supply shock is measured as a normalized change in oil production (e.g. a fall of 1 percent), the output and in ‡ation consequences are currently much more severe. Also this experiment is not realistic since an average oil production disturbance is currently only one fourth of a disturbance in the 1970s. Whether this reduced variability of oil production is due to the steepening of the oil demand curve and/or to smaller underlying disturbances in oil supply cannot be determined with our approach. In subsequent work (Baumeister and Peersman 2008), we provide evidence that oil supply volatility has indeed diminished over time.
We further show that the contribution of oil supply shocks to the variability of real activity and in ‡ation is economically very relevant, being consistently between 15 and 20 percent. Also the proportion of oil supply shocks in total variability of global oil production remained more or less constant over time (approximately 30 percent). However, despite the currently stronger impact of a supply shock on real oil prices, the contribution of these shocks to crude oil price volatility has diminished considerably from 30 percent to about 20 percent. This is only possible if also the supply curve has become more inelastic over time. Less elastic oil supply and demand curves in the global oil market both result in more variability of crude oil prices and must have contributed to the observed increase in oil price volatility. From our analysis also emerges that the Great In ‡ation of the 1970s cannot be explained by unfavorable oil supply shocks which con…rms the propositions of BK (2002, 2004) . On the other hand, there was a signi…cant but non-exclusive contribution of oil price spikes to the recessions in 1974/75, early 1980s and 1990s. However, unfavorable oil supply disturbances also signi…cantly reduced real activity around 1999, which made the ongoing economic boom more subdued. In addition, all more recent oil price surges can almost entirely be explained by shifts in global oil demand.
Finally, we propose some potential explanations for the steepening of the oil demand curve since the mid-eighties. In particular, after the oil price spikes of the 1970s, there has been substantial substitution to alternative sources of energy and more energy-e¢ cient technologies were developed. The remaining amount of oil needed is thus an absolute necessity which could result in more inelastic oil demand. Moreover, due to insu¢ cient investments in the oil industry, world oil production has been operating close to full capacity since the second half of the 1980s. Accordingly, physical shortfalls in oil production due to e.g. war activities, are di¢ cult to replace by increased production elsewhere. As a consequence, less elastic precautionary oil demand becomes more important in total oil demand at current high levels of capacity utilization. Which of these structural changes dominates or whether there exist alternative explanations should be explored in future research.
A Data appendix
World oil production data are available on a monthly basis from January 1973 onwards from the US Department of Energy (DoE). Monthly data for global production of crude oil for the period 1953M4 to 1972M12 have been taken from the Oil & Gas Journal (issue of the …rst week of each month). For the period 1947M1 to 1953M3 monthly data have been obtained by interpolation of yearly oil production data with the Litterman (1983) methodology using US monthly oil production as an indicator variable (available at DoE). 58 Annual oil production data have been retrieved from World Petroleum (1947) (1948) (1949) (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) (1954) , the Oil & Gas Journal (end-of-year issues, [1954] [1955] [1956] [1957] [1958] [1959] [1960] . Consistency between these di¤erent data sources has been checked at overlapping periods. Quarterly data are averages of monthly observations. The re…ner acquisition cost of imported crude oil is taken from the DoE database. 59 Since this series is only available from January 1974, it has been backdated until 1947Q1 using the (quarterly) growth rate of the producer price index (PPI) for crude oil from the 5 8 Since this part of the data is only needed for the training sample to initialize the priors based on the estimation of a …xed-coe¢ cient VAR, the use of interpolated data as opposed to actual ones is of minor importance. 5 9 The re…ner acquisition cost of imported crude oil (IRAC) is a volume-weighted average price of all kinds of crude oil imported into the US over a speci…ed period. Since the US imports more types of crude oil than any other country, it may represent the best proxy for a true "world oil price"among all published crude oil prices. The IRAC is also similar to the OPEC basket price.
BLS database (WPU056). Data have been converted to quarterly frequency by taking monthly averages before the extrapolation. For our robustness checks with regard to the choice of the oil price variable, we use the quarterly average of the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) spot oil price obtained from the FRED, the St.Louis FED, database and the re…ner acquisition cost of composite 60 crude oil from the DoE database. The latter has been adjusted for price controls on domestic oil production during the 1970s as described in Mork (1989) and reconstructed back in time in the same way as the imported re…ner acquisition cost series.
Quarterly seasonally adjusted series for US real and nominal GDP (GDPC1: real gross domestic product, billions of chained 2000 dollars; GDP: gross domestic product, billions of dollars) and quarterly seasonally adjusted data for the US GDP de ‡ator (GDPDEF: gross domestic product implicit price de ‡ator) have been obtained from the U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis. Monthly seasonally adjusted data for the US CPI (CPIAUCSL: consumer price index for all urban consumers: all items, index 1982-1984=100) are taken from the FRED database and have been converted to quarterly frequency by taking monthly averages. Monthly data for the civilian unemployment rate, 16 years and older, seasonally adjusted have been retrieved from the BLS database (UNRATE) and have been averaged over quarters.
B Priors and Estimation
Prior distributions and initial values. The priors for the initial states of the regression coe¢ cients, the covariances and the log volatilities, p ( 0 ), p ( 0 ) and p (ln h 0 ) respectively, are assumed to be normally distributed, independent of each other and independent of the hyperparameters. The priors are calibrated on the point estimates of a constant-coe¢ cient VAR(4) estimated over the period 1947Q2-1967Q2.
where b OLS corresponds to the OLS point estimates of the training sample and b P OLS to four times the covariance matrix b V b OLS . With regard to the prior speci…cation of 0 and h 0 we follow Primiceri (2005) and Benati and Mumtaz (2007) . Let P = AD 1=2 be the Choleski factor of the time-invariant variance covariance matrix b OLS of the reduced-form innovations from the estimation of the …xed-coe¢ cient VAR(4) where A is a lower triangular matrix with ones on the diagonal and D 1=2 denotes a diagonal matrix whose elements are the standard deviations of the residuals. Then the prior for the log volatilities is set to ln h 0 N (ln 0 ; 10 I 4 ) where 0 is a vector that contains the diagonal elements of D 1=2 squared and the variance covariance matrix is arbitrarily set to ten times the identity matrix to make the prior only weakly informative. The prior for the contemporaneous interrelations is set to 0 N h e 0 ; e V (e 0 ) i where the prior mean for 0 is obtained by taking the inverse of A and stacking the elements below the diagonal row by row in a vector in the following way: e 0 = [e 0;21 ; e 0;31 ; e 0;32 ; e 0;41 ; e 0;42 ; e 0;43 ] 0 .
The covariance matrix, e V (e 0 ), is assumed to be diagonal with each diagonal element arbitrarily set to ten times the absolute value of the corresponding element in e 0 . While this scaling is obviously arbitrary, it accounts for the relative magnitude of the elements in e 0 as has been noted by Benati and Mumtaz (2007) .
With regard to the hyperparameters, we make the following assumptions along the lines of Benati and Mumtaz (2007) . We postulate that Q follows an inverted Wishart distribution: Q IW Q 1 ; T 0 , where T 0 are the prior degrees of freedom which are set equal to the length of the training sample which is su¢ ciently long (20 years of quarterly data) to guarantee a proper prior. Following Cogley and Sargent (2002), we adopt a relatively conservative prior for the time variation in the parameters setting the scale matrix to Q = (0:01) 2 b V b OLS multiplied by the prior degrees of freedom. This is a weakly informative prior and the particular choice for its starting value is not expected to in ‡uence the results substantially since the prior is soon to be dominated by the sample information as time moves forward adding more time variation. We have experimented with di¤erent initial conditions inducing a di¤erent amount of time variation in the coe¢ cients to test whether our results are sensitive to the choice of prior speci…cation. We follow Primiceri (2005) in setting the prior degrees of freedom alternatively to the minimum value allowed for the prior to be proper, T 0 = dim ( t ) + 1, together with a smaller value of the scale matrix, Q = (0:003) 2 b V b OLS , which puts as little weight as possible on our prior belief about the drift in t . Our results are not a¤ected by di¤erent choices for the initial values of the prior. The three blocks of S are postulated to follow inverted Wishart distributions, with the prior degrees of freedom set equal to the minimum value required for the prior to be proper: MCMC algorithm (Metropolis within Gibbs sampler): Simulating the Posterior Distribution. Since sampling from the joint posterior is complicated, we simulate the posterior distribution by sequentially drawing from the conditional posterior of the four blocks of parameters: the coe¢ cients T , the simultaneous relations A T , the variances H T , where the superscript T refers to the whole sample, and the hyperparameters collectively referred to as V . Posteriors for each block of the Gibbs sampler are conditional on the observed data Y T and the rest of the parameters drawn at previous steps.
Step 1: Drawing coe¢ cient states Conditional on A T , H T , V and Y T , the measurement equation is linear and has Gaussian innovations with known variance. Therefore, the conditional posterior is a product of Gaussian densities and T can be drawn using a standard simulation smoother (see Carter and Kohn 1994; Cogley and Sargent 2002) which produces a trajectory of parameters:
From the terminal state of the forward Kalman …lter, the backward recursions produce the required smoothed draws which take the information of the whole sample into account. More speci…cally, the last iteration of the …lter provides the conditional mean T jT and variance P T jT of the posterior distribution. A draw from this distribution provides the input for the backward recursion at T 1 and so on until the beginning of the sample according to:
Step 2: Drawing covariance states Similarly, the posterior of A T conditional on T , H T , and Y T is a product of normal densities and can be calculated by applying the same algorithm as in step 1 thanks to the block diagonal structure of the variance covariance matrix S. More speci…cally, a system of unrelated regressions based on the following relation: A t u t = " t , where " t are orthogonalized innovations with known time-varying variance H t and u t = y t X 0 t t are observable residuals, can be estimated to recover A T according to the following transformed equations where the residuals are independent standard normal: Step 3: Drawing volatility states
Conditional on T ; A T ; and Y T , the orthogonalized innovations " t A t (y t X 0 t t ), with V ar (" t ) = H t , are observable. However, drawing from the conditional posterior of H T is more involved because the conditional state-space representation for ln h i;t is not Gaussian. The log-normal prior on the volatility parameters is common in the stochastic volatility literature but such a prior is not conjugate. Following Cogley and Sargent (2005, Appendix B.2.5) and Benati and Mumtaz (2007) , we apply the univariate algorithm by Jacquier, Polson and Rossi (1994) that draws the volatility states h i;t one at a time. 61 Step 4: Drawing hyperparameters
The hyperparameters of the model can be drawn directly from their respective posterior distributions since the disturbance terms of the transition equations are observable given T ; A T ; H T and Y T .
We perform 50,000 iterations of the Bayesian Gibbs sampler but keep only every 10 th draw in order to mitigate the autocorrelation among the draws. After a "burn-in" period of 50,000 iterations, the sequence of draws of the four blocks from their respective conditional posteriors converges to a sample from the joint posterior distribution p T ; A T ; H T ; V j Y T . We ascertain that our chain has converged to the ergodic distribution by performing the usual set of convergence tests (see Primiceri 2005; Benati and Mumtaz 2007). 62 In total, we collect 5000 simulated values from the Gibbs chain on which we base our structural analysis. 6 1 As opposed to Primiceri (2005) who uses the method proposed by Kim, Shephard and Chib (1998) which consists of transforming the non-Gaussian state-space form into an approximately Gaussian one by using a discrete mixture of normals. This linear transformation then allows to apply a standard simulation smoother conditional on a member of the mixture. 6 2 The results of these convergence diagnostics are available upon request.
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C Impulse responses and sign restrictions
Here we describe the Monte Carlo integration procedure we use to compute the path of structural impulse response functions to an oil supply shock. In the spirit of Koop, Pesaran and Potter (1996) we compute the generalized impulse responses as the di¤erence between two conditional expectations with and without the exogenous shock:
where y t+k contains the forecasts of the endogenous variables at horizon k, ! t represents the current information set and " t is the current disturbance term. At each point in time the information set we condition upon contains the actual values of the lagged endogenous variables and a random draw of the model parameters and hyperparameters. More speci…cally, in order to calculate the conditional expectations we simulate the model in the following way: We randomly draw one possible state of the economy at time t from the Gibbs sampler output represented by the time-varying lagged coe¢ cients and the elements of the variance covariance matrix. Starting from this random draw from the joint posterior including hyperparameters, we stochastically simulate the future paths of the coe¢ cient vector as well as the (components of the) variance covariance matrix based on the transition laws for 20 quarters into the future. 63 By projecting the evolution of the system into the future in this way, we account for all the potential sources of uncertainty deriving from the additive innovations, variations in the lagged coe¢ cients and changes in the contemporaneous relations among the variables in the system.
Given the current state of the economy, let t = P t D t P 0 t be the eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition of the VAR's time-varying variance covariance matrix t at time t. Draw an N N matrix, K, from the N (0; 1) distribution, take the QR decomposition of K where Q is a matrix whose columns are orthogonal to each other and compute the time-varying structural impact matrix as B 0;t = P t D 1 2 t Q 0 . Given this contemporaneous impact matrix, we compute the reduced-form innovations based on the relationship u t = B 0;t " t , where " t contains four structural shocks obtained by drawing from a standard normal distribution.
Impulse responses are then computed by comparing the e¤ects of a shock on the evolution of the endogenous variables to the benchmark case without shock, where in the former case the shock is set to " i;t + 1, while in the latter we only consider " i;t . The reason for this is to allow the system to be hit by other shocks during the propagation of the shock of interest. From the set of impulse responses derived in this way, we select only those impulse responses which at horizons t + k; k = 0; 1; :::; 4; satisfy the sign restrictions, i.e. display the e¤ects on the endogenous variables associated with the structural shock we wish to identify; all others are discarded.
We repeat this procedure until 100 iterations ful…l the sign restrictions and then calculate the mean responses of our four endogenous variables over these accepted simulations. For each point in time, we randomly draw 500 current states of the economy which provide the distribution of impulse responses taking into account possible developments of the structure of the economy. The representative impulse response function for each variable at each date is the median of this distribution.
[68] The Economist (2008), "Crude Measures", May 29. Spare capacity refers to production capacity that can be brought online within 30 days and sustained for 90 days. Global capacity utilization rates are calculated as percentage of total potential annual world oil production.
